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1863.

A

MILITARY SKETCH

OF THE

PRESENT WAR IN AMERICA,

FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT IN 1861

TO THE END OF MARCH 1862.

READ AT THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION,
25TH APRIL, 1862,

BY MAJOR MILLER, R.A., V.C.,
TOPOGRAPHICAL STAFF.

"And little of this great world can I speak
More than pertains to feats of broil and battle."
OTHELLO.

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

MAP
To Illustrate the First Year's Operations of the
AMERICAN WAR.
1861–2.
Scale of Miles.
80 to 1 Inch.
J R Jobbins
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
OHIO
PENNSYLVANIA
KANSAS
MISSOURI
KENTUCKY
VIRGINIA
TENNESSEE
NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTH CAROLINA
ARKANSAS
MISSISSIPPI
ALABAMA
GEORGIA
LOUISIANA
FLORIDA
GULF OF MEXICO
St Joseph
Hannibal
Richmond
Independence
Lexington
Missouri R
Boonville
Jefferson City
Warsaw
Rolla
Springfield
Carthage
St Louis
Wabash R
Ohio R
Cincinnati
Wheeling
Frankfort
Louisville
Henderson
Pikeville
Barbourville
Gawley Bridge
Kanawha R
Rappahannock R
Chesapeake Bay
Eastern Virginia
James R
RICHMOND
Yorktown
Ft Monroe
Norfolk
Chambersburg
Williamsport
Baltimore
Martinsburg
Romney
Winchester
Harpers Ferry
Annapolis
Leesburg
WASHINGTON
Manassas
Grafton
W. Union
Philippa
Beverley
Buttonville
Fredericton
Cairo
Paducah
Columbus
New Madrid
Hickman
Ft Donelson
Ft Henry
Dover
Clarksville
Bowling Green
Somerset
Manchester
Cumberland R
Cumberland gap
Nashville
Humboldt
Randolph
Memphis
Bentonville
Fayetteville
Little Rock
Arkansas R
Corinth
Florence
Decatur
Tennessee R
Elizabeth town
Edenton
Windsor
Roanoke I.
Raleigh
Hatteras
Newbern
Ocracoke Inlet
Beaufort
Port Macon
Wilmington
Columbia
Milledgeville
Fort Sumter
Charleston
Beaufort
Port Royal
Ft Pulaski
Savannah
Tybee Island
Brunswick
Fernandina
Jacksonville
St Augustine
Jackson
Montgomery
Mobile
Pensacola
Fort Pickens
Baton Rouge
New Orleans
Red R
Mississippi R
Sabine R
100 50 0 100 200

MILITARY SKETCH

OF THE

PRESENT WAR IN AMERICA.

The interest which we naturally feel in the American war has been fed from day to day by the special correspondence of the leading journals, and the ordinary intelligence of daily or weekly papers. But those notices, valuable as they are for the preparation of regular narratives, are apt to confuse as much as they inform us, unless we have the opportunity to treat them as a study. They group together events widely separated from one another both in time and place; they include, in one short paragraph, intelligence from the Atlantic coast and the rivers of the West; they give one day flying reports which they contradict the next, and they republish the same incidents in a new form a month afterwards. When, therefore, I was asked to give a lecture on the subject, I felt that I might do some service in collating these scattered accounts, and in producing a connected sketch from their voluminous materials. Brief and incomplete as the result may be, it may yet lighten the labour of other students, or increase the interest of following the future operations, by rendering more clear those which are past

I need hardly say that a lecture delivered in this room should be something more than a mere summary of facts. If it treats of military history, it should point out how far principles were vindicated by the results of observing or neglecting established rules, and how any new weapon or any new feature in the equipment of an army influenced its movements or affected its achievements. If this ideal is but little realized, I must, in this instance, beg your indulgence; I could only give an hour or two of the evening to my task, and it is far more laborious to hunt for facts through the extensive columns of daily papers than to study a subject when it is already arranged in books. Moreover, it is much more difficult to describe concisely half a dozen disconnected operations, without definite beginning, without unity of plan, and not yet ended, than to master a campaign directed by skilful commanders and executed by men well acquainted with their work.

This last difficulty will diminish as the war progresses, and there is a far higher interest connected with the present operations than with the desultory marches and petty skirmishes in the first months of the war. When once the men can be relied on for marches and manœuvres, when they are able to do what an army ought, there is no reason why the celebrated campaigns of the Old World should not be equalled in the New. America may yet produce generals of the highest order, but it is to be wished that she should refrain from giving them names in anticipation of their achievements.

My purpose being to touch upon such points only as might be developed into a military history, I pass over in silence the causes which led to the separation of the Southern and the Northern States. But we ought to bear in mind the time at which a rupture was seriously spoken of as not only possible but probable, because we may fairly presume that the military preparations, on one side at least, may be traced back to that date.

It was in the early part of November, 1860, when the success of the Republican party in the contest for electing a President was no longer doubtful, that excitement began to be shown; it gained strength when the result of the ballot was declared; and serious apprehensions began to be felt, which were soon to be fully realized. On the 13th December certain representatives from Southern States had a meeting at Washington, in which they declared that all hope of an honourable adjustment was extinguished, and that their only refuge lay in a prompt secession. Within a few days the declaration was reduced to practice. On the 19th December South Carolina took the lead, and resolved, by a unanimous vote, to withdraw from the Federal Constitution; Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia followed her example early in January, and in all these States possession was taken of the forts and arsenals, which were generally left without any military force to protect them. Fort Pickens, near Pensacola, and Fort Sumter, at the entrance to Charleston harbour, escaped this fate from having small garrisons of regular troops. The surrender of the latter was officially demanded from President Buchanan by a Special Commissioner sent to Washington, and, of course, refused.

But, though not yielding in this point, the Government remained almost inactive. The President said that he refrained from sending any reinforcements to a threatened point lest they should be regarded as a menace of coercion, and thus furnish to the disaffected an excuse for an outbreak. Afterwards the Secretary of War announced that reinforcements would be sent to any post if they were demanded by the officer in charge, or if they seemed to be required for safety's sake. With this the people were content ; New York quietly followed her commercial business, and Washington swarmed with place-hunters, anxious only about getting appointments under the new administration. The Seceders, on the other hand, declared their intention of seizing those forts which had hitherto escaped their grasp; they began to throw up batteries, and put guns in position, to enrol men, and prepare munitions of war ; at Charleston, which had become the point of principal interest, an attack on Fort Sumter was daily expected.

Nearly two months passed in this manner. Major Anderson, the officer in command at Fort Sumter, demanded reinforcements, but the Cabinet,

not acting up to the Secretary's announcement, was divided in opinion about sending them, and reports were generally current that the place would be given up. The very day was mentioned. On the 23rd of March the garrison was to be withdrawn, and an opposite rumour that such a step was not quite decided was positively contradicted by a Washington paper.

With this chance of obtaining possession by fair means, the Confederate States, as they began to call themselves, were for the time content; there was too much risk connected with a war to hurry on without necessity such a step as must inevitably cause one. But on the 6th of April there came news that reinforcements of men and an armed squadron had been ordered to Charleston; then their activity broke into new life; 5,000 more men were called out, fresh batteries were thrown up, the supplies of food hitherto allowed to go from the town to the fort were immediately stopped, and Major Anderson was summoned to surrender the place.

On receiving his refusal the attack was ordered. Firing from the batteries began at four o'clock on the morning of the 12th of April; it lasted all that day, and was renewed on the next. Several steamers, tardily arrived with the reinforcements on board, watched the cannonade from the harbour's entrance. At one o'clock the Federal flag was hauled down, and Major Anderson surrendered on easy terms.

As being the first collision in so remarkable a war, this cannonade of Fort Sumter has a claim upon our interest, but the contemporary accounts in the American papers threw over it such an air of burlesque as it will hardly recover in the present generation. Stripped of its historical importance it has but little left; the contest may have been severe and the gallantry great, but one could not resist a smile on learning that a salute which was fired to celebrate the victory, and during which a gun burst, killing two men and wounding four others, did in a moment more serious mischief than was inflicted by the two parties together, during the incessant cannonade of one day and a half.

The news of the Federal troops having been driven by force out of the last point which remained to them between Chesapeake Bay and the Gulf of Mexico stirred up the indignation of the North. The apathy of the people was immediately changed into an intense excitement, and the passive attitude of the Government was succeeded by a due energy. War was formally declared on the next day but one to the receipt of the intelligence; 75,000 of the militia were ordered out by the same proclamation; three weeks afterwards 42,000 volunteers were called for, 22,000 men added to the regular army, and 18,000 seamen decreed for the navy.

These troops were to be furnished in set proportions by the various States, and the demand for them became a test of allegiance; in the north and north-west they were enthusiastically furnished; in other directions they were emphatically refused. The Governor of Missouri denounced immediately and strongly the requisition of troops for such an object. "Not one man," said he, "will the State of Missouri furnish to carry on such an unholy crusade." The Governor of Kentucky used similar language. Tennessee, Arkansas, Virginia, and North Carolina went further; they seceded. In Maryland the Legislature adopted a resolution which condemned the war; the Governor objected to troops from the Northern

States going through Baltimore, and the lower classes actually opposed their passage. A Massachusetts regiment on its way to Washington had to fight its way through the mob, and a Pennsylvanian regiment not yet supplied with arms was driven back from the town. To make the route positively impracticable the railway bridges were destroyed. So determined was the opposition, that levies from New England had to be sent round by sea from New York to the head of the Chesapeake, until (about the 14th of May) Baltimore was forcibly occupied by Federal troops, the railway guarded by sentinels, and martial law proclaimed.

Rapidly as the call to arms was answered on the north side of the Potomac, it could not prevent the loss of two important places which the mere presence of a few hundred men would have saved. On the 18th of April, a body of Virginians went to seize Harper's Ferry, where there was an arsenal with 15,000 stand of arms. Hearing of their approach, and unable to oppose it, the officer in charge filled the buildings with straw, set fire to the establishment, and departed. On the same day the navy yard at Norfolk was likewise abandoned and burnt. The ships lying in ordinary there were fired, or scuttled and sunk; and the only one in commission, the "Cumberland," was towed away. Nearly a year afterwards this ship was run into and sunk by the "Merrimac," one of those which the Federals had tried to destroy.

Washington itself was in considerable danger for a fortnight after the outbreak at Charleston; its escape was due to the enemy's weakness only, for it had no troops in garrison, and its situation was most exposed; on one side was Virginia, which had actually seceded, and on the other was Maryland opposing the passage of troops sent to its aid. However, by the last week in May, militia and volunteers had arrived in sufficient numbers to make it tolerably secure, and the newspapers had already planned magnificent and immediate operations, such as would crush out in a few weeks what they called the rebellion, and re-establish the Federal authority in every State. It is, then, from this time—from about the 1st of May—that the actual campaign may be said to begin; let us, therefore, in anticipation of it, cast a glance at the strength and resources of the rival Powers.

Both being without any standing army—for the few regiments employed to watch the Indian tribes were but a cipher compared to the numbers now required—we may turn at once to the population as an index of the force which might with equal convenience be raised on either side; and, having deducted from the census returns the neutral States and the slave populations, we shall see that by this rule the Federals would send into the field 340,000 for every 100,000 raised in the South. This is, of course, on the supposition that an equal desire to fight pervaded both masses of people; but if there were only half the enthusiasm for the Union as for Secession, still the men of the South, as they buckled on their swords or shouldered their muskets, must expect to be outnumbered in every engagement. Sooner or later, this human tide from the North would be pressing upon them; and where were they to look for means of strengthening their hold or of stopping its progress? Not to fortified places, for inland there were none. Not to greater facilities for moving troops from point to point, for to every forty miles of railroad in the

South there were one hundred in the North; and assuredly not to the artillery and small arms, for in these the inferiority of the South was far more conspicuous. There were but few good weapons in the arsenals and stores, and but few manufactories capable of producing them; without the command of the sea, munitions of war could not be obtained from foreign countries, and the stock might be exhausted quicker than it could be supplied.

These, then, were the circumstances under which the war began. Sixteen States of the North were arrayed against eleven of the South, and three were neutral or divided. The North had, as compared with the South, more than three times the white population, great advantages in equipment, manufactories, and railway communication; an entire command of the sea, and fourteen times the naval resources: its commerce would remain unharmed, except by an occasional privateer; and everything needful might be made at home or obtained from abroad. The South must expect to see its trade ruined, its coasts invaded, its rivers made thoroughfares at the enemy's convenience, the divided States won by force, and then—*then* the resistance she might continue to offer must depend on the unity of sentiment among all classes, and the degree of resolution which survived the trial. She might find in history glorious examples of great invasions being successfully resisted, and of weak inhabitants becoming invincible in the defence of their own firesides; but such a contest is full of bitterness and misery, and success depends on moral qualities, of whose existence we cannot be sure until we see their effects.

I will not pretend to guide you to any conclusions beyond what are based on the rude comparisons I have made; but those I beg you to keep in mind in observing the successive phases of the war.

For six weeks after war was declared the Federal troops were almost shut up in their own capital; it was not till the 23rd of May that they even occupied the suburb of Alexandria, on the opposite side of the river; and, having advanced so far, they remained stationary nearly two months, fortifying the outskirts, spending most of their time in the bar-rooms of the town, and talking always of advancing to Richmond "next week." The world in general, knowing how unfit they yet were for anything but their present employment, watched with more interest the two isolated forts called Pickens and Monroe, both of which were surrounded by Secessionists, greedy of a second bloodless victory.

Fort Monroe, which stands at the entrance to the James River, opposite Norfolk, had been strongly reinforced by the first arrivals from the North, and its commander made an effort to rid himself of his beleaguers. His attempt furnished a curious example of the blunders which may be committed by raw soldiers in the hands of equally raw officers.

Two columns, starting from different points, were to unite at the meeting of two roads, and proceed together against the enemy's position. The march was made at night, and the attack was to begin at daybreak. At the appointed time the first regiment arrived at the fork of the roads, and the second had approached to a hundred yards distance, when, without a word of notice, the first opened fire with artillery and musketry upon it. How such a fatal blunder could have been made seems inexplicable, especially as the artillery fire proves it was not confined to a few

bewildered men. There was no enemy in sight to make a confusion between friend and foe; there could have been no enemy in the direction from which this unfortunate regiment had arrived. The incident is a practical caution against using such troops for the most simply combined movements, and other instances occurred in course of the campaign to show that there was a continual risk of such a mistake.

The rest of the actions in this neighbourhood were principally engagements between coast batteries and gunboats on the Chesapeake, and creeks communicating with it,—engagements too numerous to describe, too unimportant to dwell upon; it was on the other side of Washington that the prospects or circumstances of either side were first influenced by force of arms.

Western Virginia, widely separated from the rest of the State by the parallel ranges of the Alleghany Mountains, is equally distinct in the general occupations of its inhabitants, and, as a natural consequence, in its political opinions. It held to the North; it declared itself against secession from the Federal Government, but it inconsistently passed an ordinance of secession from its own State, and proposed to create itself into a fresh one by the name of Kanawha: in the meantime it invited the presence of Federal troops for the protection and encouragement of the loyal inhabitants. In consequence of this appeal, M'Clellan moved thither from Cincinnati, on the Ohio, and entered on the campaign with energy and good fortune. His first success was at Grafton, a station where the railway to Wheeling joins that which connects Cincinnati with Harper's Ferry and Washington; his next was at Philippa, where he surprised one of the enemy's camps. Turning then towards the hill ranges, he attacked and defeated Colonel Pegram at Rich Mountain, and on the following day had a much more important success at Beverley, where he took six guns, and claimed to have routed 10,000 men, though, more probably, half that number. Coming up with the retreating army at Huttonville, he routed them again, and General Garnett, their leader, was slain. A detached force, acting under his orders in the Kanawha Valley, also had some success at Barbourville. By this series of defeats, suffered within six weeks, secession was crushed in that part of the country, and the State Government established at Wheeling was recognised at Washington as the Government of Virginia.

The cause fared but little better in that mountainous tract which lies between Western Virginia and Washington. Harper's Ferry is at the point where the easternmost ridge, as it is generally shown in maps, runs up to the River Potomac; and the neighbourhood, on either side of the river, was occupied by about 15,000 Southern troops, sent up to help those who had made the original seizure. So important a point was not likely to remain undisturbed, and at the end of May large bodies were moving thither from Pennsylvania. Their point of assembly was at Chambersburg, whence they made an advance in force on the 12th of June; from Washington 6,000 men advanced at the same time, and a column was reported to be coming simultaneously from the West. Not venturing to oppose this combination, the Southerners* abandoned the

* The term "Southerners" was used throughout the lecture to avoid any misapprehension which might arise from the similarity of sound in Federals and Confederates.

place in good time without firing a shot. They took the direction of Winchester, followed by a brigade of Federals under Cadwallader, but before coming to a halt they turned in a north-westerly direction, and encamped at Runker's Hill, twelve miles from Martinsburg. On observing them to take this advantageous position, Cadwallader's brigade retired to the ferry. In this camp the Southerners remained for a fortnight, making one or two successful expeditions, but otherwise inactive. On the 2nd of July they received an attack, great and conclusive on paper, but without any apparent influence on their position, for on the 15th of the month the Federal forces, 15,000 strong, were again advancing upon them at the same place. General Patterson commanded these Federals; he was particularly instructed to threaten the Southerners at Winchester, and prevent them from joining their main body at Manassas, but he turned off to Charlestown, and, instead of holding the field, was said to be busy with plans for rebuilding bridges and re-opening canals. It is only fair to him to say that his division, composed of men organised on truly American principles, was as unsatisfactory a body as a general could be condemned to command. It numbered in all 20,000 men, out of which there were nineteen regiments whose short term of service was up, or would expire in a few days; and fifteen of them, he said, refused to stop one hour beyond that time. A want of transport waggons, a deficiency only too likely to exist, was another excuse offered for him, but the Government had suffered by his mistake, and would not overlook it; General Banks was sent to supersede him.

To his inactivity in not preventing any junction between the Southern troops at Winchester and those at Manassas it was convenient to attribute a great share in the disaster at Bull's Run. Just at the time when he was operating in the valley beyond the Blue Ridge, the authorities at Washington, encouraged by M'Clellan's successes, had given way to the eagerness of the people, and the Grand Army of the Potomac, so called by its admirers, had started for Richmond. You cannot need reminding what the result of that advance was. You cannot have forgotten how the American papers pronounced that the Grand Army might make another triumphal march to Canada as soon as it had reaped the laurels of this; nor how the Grand Army returned to Washington in a panic-stricken mass, officers and men hurrying along without their arms in terror and dismay, shamelessly spreading as they ran the news of their own ignominious defeat. But you may not remember so well the steps which led to that contemptible result, and those I will therefore briefly recapitulate.

The forces which marched from Washington on the 16th of July consisted of 30,000 infantry, 10 squadrons of cavalry, and 60 guns, organised in five divisions of unequal strength General M'Dowell commanded the whole. The enemy's force was not so well known; his main body was near Manassas, where two converging lines of railway gave him easy communication with all the Southern States; his position was said to be naturally strong and skilfully fortified, but the nature of the works, and the number of the men to defend them, had been artfully kept secret.

On the 18th of July a skirmish at Centreville, magnified by the newspapers into a battle, and construed as a victory because the Southerners retired, raised the hopes and confidence of the expedition; the 19th and

20th were spent in reconnoitering; and on Sunday the 21st the battle was fought.—*(See plan.)*

Between Centreville and Manassas there is a brook or river, called Bull's Run; the two roads by which it could most easily be crossed were strongly held by the enemy, but at three miles up the stream there was an unguarded ford, and another, at half the distance, almost unprotected. General M'Dowell therefore determined to move his main body round by these, to turn the enemy's left, and destroy the railway on that side. On the lower of the two roads a feint was made to distract the enemy's attention; by the other road two brigades advanced over the stream, and joined their line to that of the brigades which had crossed by the upper fords. Up to three o'clock in the afternoon all went well, but till then Beauregard, of the South, had not brought all his force into action. An important order had miscarried. He had intended to make a decisive attack early in the day by that road which M'Dowell had avoided to force, and had sent the necessary instructions to the general on that side; but, learning that nothing had been done towards executing this project, and seeing that his left was already pressed, he thought better to move to the support of the left wing the troops intended for the attack, than to risk a repulse there, which might neutralise his success elsewhere. It was not till this movement was completed that the Federals' determination was put to the proof. The issue was not yet decided, when there came on the field a brigade from that force which General Patterson was to have kept in check (part of it had previously arrived), and a second detachment leaving the train before arriving at the usual station, marched across the country, and fell upon the Federals' right and rear. "Their fire," says General M'Dowell, "caused our men to break and retire, and this soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain; the battalion of regular infantry alone moved up, and maintained itself until our men could get down to the road on the way back."

Observe, I beg, how that sentence illustrates the effect of discipline, and the difference between trained and untrained men; one battalion of real soldiers came forward at need to protect the flight of twenty times their number. But those who fled, and continued to flee, still victims to their panic, when the danger was far behind them, take at least a higher place in our opinion than those who left the ranks that day without striking a blow. The 4th Pennsylvania Volunteers and a battery of the New York Militia turned homewards as the army went into battle because their three months of service had expired. Not overlooked nor unsolicited; General M'Dowell wrote to the regiment, and the Secretary of War appealed to the battery, trying to induce them to remain, if it were but five days longer; but they insisted on their immediate discharge, and on the morning of the 21st they moved to the rear, as General M'Dowell says, "to the sound of the enemy's cannon." A disclosure humiliating but not unprecedented. I could not mention a parallel case out of America, because the conditions of military service elsewhere are so widely different; but in the American War of Independence it occurred, sadly often, that men enlisted for a few months only, refused to remain in arms beyond


SKETCH
To Illustrate the Operations
NEAR
WASHINGTON.
1861.
Scale of Miles
0 1 2 3 4 5 10
Poolsville
LEESBURG
Edward's Ferry
Skirmish
21st Oct.
Darnstown
ROCKVILLE
Goose Creek
Drainsville
Skirmish
20th Dec.
WASHINGTON
Long Bridge
Bulls Run
FAIRFAX
Centreville
Skirmish
18th July
ALEXANDRIA
Potomac River
Station
BATTLE
21st July
Manassas
Junction
Occoquan R.
BRENTVILLE

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that term, however imminent an action might seem, or however important their presence might be. We have seen how another part of this army suffered from the same defect, and it only remains for us to wonder that a system, which General Washington had so strongly denounced, should have been allowed to give further proofs of its utter badness.

General Beauregard stated his total force to be 27,000, and the casualties to amount to 393 killed and 1,200 wounded. M'Dowell reported 481 killed and 1,011 wounded. He estimates the number who actually crossed Bull's Run at 18,000, but that does not include four brigades posted on the roads at or near Centreville. On the whole, we may consider the forces and casualties as pretty evenly divided; but if the missing men in the Federal army could have been accurately numbered on the night of the 21st, a formidable total would have been exhibited.

The Southerners took no advantage of their victory; they merely re-occupied the heights near Alexandria, which they had once before held, and the new alarm which they inspired at Washington soon died away. They certainly cannot be said to have taught their enemies how to conquer, and yet this defeat had a more beneficial effect on the discipline and efficiency of the Federal army than if it had been an easy victory. Taught by the mortification of failure, the authorities saw the necessity of a more active commander and a more strict control; they turned to M'Clellan, as the only general whose ability had yet been stamped with success, and placed him at the head of the army.

Leaving his division in Western Virginia, he arrived at Washington on the 26th, and addressed himself forthwith to the hard task of turning Americans into soldiers. He succeeded well in that respect; the streets of Washington were less infested by idle officers and men, but the campaign was not advanced. Its history for the next six months, in this district, may be dismissed in a few words. The army was confined to the intrenchments round Washington till the 28th September, when the Southerners unexpectedly retired from the advanced position they had held. In moving out to occupy the deserted posts, certain regiments managed to repeat the blunder committed at Little Bethel, and fired upon one another with fatal effect. Eastern Virginia was occupied in November, and some great reviews took place; a few skirmishes, of which one will be noticed by and bye, may also be picked out of the American news, but no division of the army contributed so little to the first annals of the war as that which was called the Grand Army of the Potomac.

In Western Virginia the troops from which M'Clellan had been removed fell under the command of General Rosecranz, and seemed, by the newspaper accounts, to keep up their reputation for activity and good fortune. Scarcely a mail arrived without the news of some gallant skirmish or important victory, but the result of them all was that the little campaign which began at Gawley Bridge on the Kanawha terminated at the very same point; and the neighbourhood of Beverley, where M'Clellan had won his last battle, was the scene of another victory ten weeks afterwards. In short, when the troops went into winter quarters they were no further advanced in the State than they had been four months earlier in the year.

In the north of Virginia there were also many little combats of a kindred nature to those in the West, similarly described and equally extolled, but foiled by one reverse which could neither be passed over in silence nor transformed into a victory. Being of more importance and interest than the rest, it claims a few moments of your attention. At Leesburg, 30 miles north-west from Washington, a part of the Southern army was stationed, the Potomac River, a few miles off, separating the outposts from those of the Federal division under General Banks, whose headquarters were at Darnstown—(*see plan*). Under him was General Stone at Poolesville, and Colonel Baker commanded the regiments nearest to the river. To this officer General Stone sent a sudden and laconic order to make a dash at Leesburg. Over the river, swollen with heavy rains, 400 men were sent by night in a few small boats; in the early morn they pushed on boldly, but rashly without support, to Leesburg, found the enemy there, and were quickly obliged to return to the river side. Small reinforcements were sent over to their help, and in the afternoon Colonel Baker came to take the command. The Southerners were superior in number, but had no artillery; the Federals had three guns, but the ground was unfavourable for their use. About four o'clock Colonel Baker was shot, and the Federals, gradually despairing of driving back the enemy, began to seek means for their own retreat. And then came the terrible scene which cannot fail to come when the rushing current of a wide river has to be crossed by beaten men with insufficient means at their disposal: such scenes have been often described, and only repeat themselves; let figures tell the story of this. Of 1,800 men who had left the Maryland side, one-third were left on the opposite bank, the three pieces of artillery were lost, and in one regiment there were said to be only two swords, and not one musket, left.

So great was the alarm created by this disaster that the Federals might have suffered seriously if they had been attacked immediately in that part of the line; but except that the Southern troops at Leesburg were reinforced, as if such a thing were intended, the action at Edward's Ferry (or Ball's Bluff) made no difference in their relative situations, and within a couple of months a chance skirmish took place between Leesburg and Washington, in which the fortune of war inclined to the opposite side. The scene of the encounter was at Drainesville, and the contest was occasioned by sending an expedition to take a quantity of forage which the Secessionists had collected there. The action was sharper than usual; on each side a brigade with some artillery was engaged, but that of the Federals was stronger than the other, and the affair lasted but one hour. Forty of the enemy were found dead on the ground, and fifty loads of forage, with two ammunition waggons, were brought back in triumph to Washington.

In the same column of the "Times" with the official report of the Drainesville engagement there was also the announcement that elsewhere a camp had been surprised, and the Southerners in it, with their arms, waggons, and tents, captured by hundreds. At first sight it seemed to form part of the operations in or near Virginia; it was really as independent of them in plan as it was remote in situation, and to the country where it happened I must now invite your attention, a country as far from

Washington or the banks of the Potomac as the coasts of Africa or the boundaries of Russia are from our own metropolis.

Where the waters of the Ohio unite with the Mississippi, after inclining towards one another for 150 miles, public feeling is divided between attachment to the Union and determination to secede. Kentucky and Tennessee on the east, and Missouri on the west, long halted between the two opinions, and the southern counties of Illinois, above the meeting of the rivers, were affected by a Secessionist tendency, though they had not weight enough to control or influence the policy of the State. Cairo, therefore, as its most southern point, was early occupied by Federal troops, whilst Randolph, below the doubtful States, was the headquarters of the Secessionist force. Thus stood the two parties when Fort Sumter fell, and President Lincoln called for troops to crush the rebellious South. In Missouri the Governor characterised the requisition—I quote his words—as "illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, and diabolical;" but there were many people ready to apply equally strong epithets to his own despatch, and a contest in the State immediately began. Forces were raised for the cause of the Union; their appointed General, Lyon, refused to disband them at the Governor's order, and, when the State militia was called out to enforce the command, he began the campaign by attacking and defeating a part of it at Booneville.

His personal career was but a short one. The Governor's troops, commanded by General Price, having moved towards the south-west, he followed in pursuit. His van-guard engaged them at Carthage on the 5th of July, and his main body came up with them on the 10th of August, near Springfield. An action ensued, of which the result was important, and the description curious It begins by telling how 8,000 Federals attacked 23,000 Southerners, spread slaughter and dismay in their ranks, killed two of their generals, and destroyed all their tents and waggons: it ends by a brief remark that the very army which had done so much had retreated several miles, and might be considered *safe*. And by degrees these facts became evident, that it was the Federals who were defeated; that they lost a gun; that General Lyon was killed on the field, and that St. Louis itself was in danger of capture.

Instead, however, of attacking the head-quarters of the Federalists, General Price took a northerly direction, and shortly appeared before Lexington, on the Missouri, where he was joined by a body of troops from the neighbouring state of Kansas, and fresh levies raised by Governor Jackson. An entrenched camp near the river was occupied by 3,500 Federals; on this, when his force was fully assembled, General Price opened fire; 1,500 men coming to its relief from Richmond, in the north-west, were easily driven back; and on the evening of the 20th September the place was surrendered.

Its loss was angrily felt by the Federalists; the whole garrison, with artillery, stores of considerable value, 900,000 dollars in money, and an important position, had been allowed to fall into the enemy's hands; strong indignation was expressed against General Fremont, who commanded at St. Louis, for omitting to send such reinforcements as would have prevented it, and preparations were made to recover the post. Fremont himself started on this expedition, but by the time he reached Jefferson City, Price

had retired towards the town of Independence, whence he soon returned to the south-west of the State. The Federals followed him in several divisions by various routes, and on the 25th October there was a skirmish between them at Springfield, but Price was expecting to be joined by a division under General M'Culloch, and till then it was not his interest to fight a battle. Even after the junction he continued to retire until he reached the boundaries of Arkansas. About that time a change took place in the command and movements of the Federal army. General Fremont was superseded by Hunter, and the divisions in this part of the State began to retrace their steps. Price in his turn became the pursuer, and was back at Springfield by the 25th November.

During the winter months of December and January both parties remained inactive—the Federals did not claim a single victory.—February had arrived when they began to assemble their divisions preparatory to attacking Price, who was still in his old quarters at Springfield. When they advanced upon him he repeated his old tactics of retiring towards Arkansas—there the fighting began. Whether he was brought to bay, or whether he voluntarily took the offensive, I cannot say; but there was a series of engagements extending over several days, and comprising an important battle at a place near Bentonville, called Pea Ridge. In this, M'Culloch, one of Price's generals, was reported to be killed and the Southern force entirely dispersed, but I have seen no official despatch or authentic account of the battle; and by the last intelligence the Federals had fallen back into Missouri, which is no sign of success, whatever policy may have dictated the step. Many of these victories assume very small proportions when measured by the results which attend them.

You will do well to remember that all our intelligence is derived from Northern sources, and the accounts of one side only are never a safe authority. In any war we can only approach the truth by carefully weighing the statements of both parties, which, in this one, are beyond our reach. The case of the Southerners is that of the lions in the fable, who were always shown in pictures as being killed by man, because lions were never the painters.

The engagement to which I referred on beginning this account of the war in Missouri, was one of those disconnected affairs with which every civil war abounds. Here they pervaded the whole State; in the north part they occurred near the Mississippi, or along the railway which connects the western interior with the great lakes of the North. In the south-east the scene of them was near Fredericton, the point in dispute there being apparently the command of that unfinished railway which is to give the town of St. Louis a direct communication with Memphis, and thence with the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean. Also from the frontiers of Kansas there were occasional tidings of conflicts, and along the banks of the Lower Mississippi parties of Federals from Cairo occasionally landed, fought, and returned whence they had set out. The Federals were undoubtedly stronger in arms, but their force was not applied with corresponding success. It was in Missouri as it had been in Virginia: the want of an established military system retarded the development of their resources, and impeded the application of their strength; it made the excellent weapons with which they were armed comparatively

useless in their hands; it put the wretchedly-equipped levies of the South on almost equal terms with their adversaries; and, had not the vast numbers of the Federal army been assisted by an irresistible naval force, another season might have passed away without bringing any return for the profuse military outlay of the war. On the sea coast, where the broadsides of the ships could overpower the batteries on land, bodies of Federal troops had lodged themselves; in districts where any sympathy was shown by the people the superiority of the Federal strength had also made itself felt; and now an expedition was being prepared in which both these allies would be brought into play. Starting from Cairo for the invasion of Kentucky and Tennessee, and following the course of two navigable rivers, it would be accompanied by iron-plated gunboats, would be assisted by all the water transport of the country, and would penetrate two States whose inhabitants were partly favourable to its success.

For a long time these two States had enjoyed an immunity from the scourge of the war. Kentucky professed a strict neutrality; refusing to furnish troops to the North, it equally declined to secede with the South; professing a desire for nothing but peace, it protested against either of the combatants occupying its soil or even crossing its territory. Tennessee, more committed to secession, was secure from hostilities so long as the protests of Kentucky were respected; but at the beginning of September the Southerners presumed to occupy Hickman, and the Federals Paducah: both disregarded the Governor's injunctions to quit, and at once Kentucky became a new theatre of war.

The Federals were along the Ohio River, the northern boundary of the State, posted principally at Cincinnati and Cairo, with a footing in the State at Louisville and Paducah. For them a perfect network of railways communicated with all parts of the rear. For the Southerners there were only two lines, leading from the Ohio River to the interior of the country; one through Nashville, the other through Humboldt; but the natural features which had prevented the construction of railways might serve well in a defensive campaign, and the Cumberland Mountain range, which traverses the district, might prove a useful ally in time of need.

Columbus on the Mississippi was for a time the principal Southern camp; but according as the Federals threatened to advance from Henderson, Louisville, and Cincinnati, Bowling Green in the centre was occupied by troops under General Buckner, and the western part by others, under General Zollicoffer. The latter was the first to be engaged. The Federals arrived in his neighbourhood early in October, and on the 21st he made an unsuccessful attack upon them. Again, on the 13th of December, he was reported to be moving from Cumberland River to Somerset, and a fight was said to be imminent. On the 19th of January he fulfilled this expectation by again taking the initiative. How he had employed the interval of a month between places which are only twenty miles apart, I cannot explain; but the immediate inducement for the attack was that the enemy's force had divided—one part remaining in camp, whilst the other made a flanking movement. To seize this opportunity sounds both bold and wise, but the result was highly unfortunate; General Zollicoffer himself was killed, his men were driven back to their camp, and, being pursued and attacked there, fled again, leaving behind them

10 field guns, 100 waggons, 1,200 horses, and a great quantity of small arms and stores. General Crittenden, next in command, rallied them at Monticello, but soon made a further retreat, and the Federals followed them up.

This defeat amounted to a disaster, so serious an aspect did it bear from every point of view. The loss of so much matériel was a serious blow to an army so imperfectly equipped. The loss of the position and disorganization of the troops exposed the flank of their main line to be turned by an enemy numerous enough to do so without risk, and the repulse itself had a disheartening effect on their courage, coming as it did in the wake of the long fruitless struggle in Missouri, and their recent defeat at Drainesville, in Virginia. I was near adding to the list another battle lately fought in the corner of Kentucky, near Pikeville, a hundred miles from Somerset, by which a Brigadier General Nelson suddenly became famous. The Confederates captured and slain by his skill were, it appeared, exactly 2,415, including two generals; and I should have liked to describe the wonderful manœuvre—for it was a wonderful one—by which he was reported to have secured the result.

But on coming to the newspapers of a fortnight's later date, I had to strike out the notes I had made. "Somebody," as Mr. Russell said, "had blown the general's trumpet a little too loud and a little too long." There were 25 killed—not 400; there were 50 prisoners instead of 2,000; and the battle was without a manœuvre at all; "but it was a glorious victory," an American paper still said, "and has rejoiced the hearts of the nation and greatly cast down its enemies." Glorious or not (and I should say *not*), any success was valuable in that part of the State whilst General Thomas was moving from Somerset towards the Cumberland Mountains, and troops from Cincinnati and other points on the Ohio were marching southwards for Bowling Green.

At this place, the junction of two railways, the Southerners were in considerable numbers, under General Buckner. Further west they were stronger still; 40,000 men were said to be at Columbus, and an attack upon Paducah was hinted at, but there was no fighting beyond a few skirmishes, until General Grant's expedition entered the State.

With nineteen regiments of infantry, four of cavalry, and seven batteries of artillery, an important addition to the troops already in Kentucky, General Grant arrived at Paducah on the 15th January. A flotilla of gunboats, prepared to steam up any navigable river, was ready to take part in the expedition, and their heavy guns, protected by plated sides, were more numerous and far more formidable than the field artillery of the force. Fort Henry, against which the first operations were to be directed, was an earthwork on the river Tennessee, a little outside the boundary line of Kentucky; thrown up by the Federals during the previous summer, it had not strength of construction to resist a long attack from superior forces, and, commanded by higher ground on both sides of the river, it could only be regarded as an useful outpost, to be given up, when attacked, if it could not be adequately supported. Reinforcements to the amount of three or four regiments were sent thither when it was first threatened, but these were barely enough to guard a retreat; they encamped outside and retired without fighting; only sixty men remained inside to fight the guns,

which should have had twice or thrice that number for their service. When, therefore, the seven gunboats opened their fire, they reduced the place in one hour and ten minutes without any aid from General Grant, though in doing so they suffered more than twice the loss they inflicted on the garrison, and one was utterly disabled. A general, named Tilgham, and the sixty men, were taken prisoners; ten heavy guns, ten light ones, and seventeen mortars were found in the place, and for what purpose the mortars could have been placed there I am at a loss to conceive. The fort itself was flooded by the rising of the stream, and had to be abandoned within a week, a sufficient proof of the badness of the site.

In the meantime General Grant had moved across from the Tennessee to the Cumberland River, which here runs in a parallel direction at ten miles distance. At Dover, on the Cumberland, the Southerners had entrenchments of considerable extent, held by a considerable body of men; and they knew that much depended on the firmness of their stand here. Long before the fall of Fort Henry, before even the expedition had left Cairo, a Richmond paper had noticed the threatening aspect of Buell's formidable force near Bowling Green, and had clearly pointed out the disasters that might ensue if this point were forced. Since then Thomas had defeated Zollicoffer in the east of the State, Mitchell's division had advanced to Bowling Green in the centre, and thirty-five regiments, aided by gunboats, were ready to attack their stronghold in the West. The crisis had become more serious; to meet it they had sent for the general reputed to be their most able commander, Albert Johnson, and had brought Beauregard, the victor at Bull's Run, with 15,000 men, from Virginia to Kentucky: neither of these, however, were at Dover when the fatal day arrived.

The interval between the 6th February, when Fort Henry was taken, and the 15th February, when the entrenched position at Dover, called Fort Donnelson, was attacked, was spent in marching over the country and investing the place. At daylight on the 15th the action was begun by the opposite side; the Southern generals, finding that they were surrounded by the enemy, cut off from supplies, and imperfectly defended by their earthworks, resolved to take the offensive, hoping to obtain at least such a success as would enable them to open a gap for retreat through the investing lines. For a time they were successful; they drove back the right wing on the centre, and had managed to capture an entire field battery; but, whilst so engaged, part of their own entrenchments had been stormed and won, and their efforts to dispossess the new occupants were of no avail. The loss of this point, which commanded the rest of the line, made it doubtful whether they could hold out one more day; but retreat was again as difficult as it had been before the sortie, for the enemy had reoccupied his former positions, and all the day's labour had been thrown away.

A second council of war was therefore held, and a very remarkable course was adopted. Of three generals, Floyd, the senior, thought it useless to fight, but vowed he would not surrender; Pillow, the next, was in favour of fighting; Buckner, the third, preferred a surrender to every other course. That generals in council should hold opposite opinions is not extraordinary; but never, I should think, has any difference been

terminated or reconciled like this. General Floyd gave up the command to Pillow, on condition of being allowed to retire with his own brigade; Pillow in his turn made it over to Buckner on a similar condition, that his own personal movements should be left unfettered; and Buckner, then able to act on his own opinion, surrendered the whole force on no condition at all. This triple transfer finished the episode of Fort Donnelson.

The Federals claim to have taken 13,300 prisoners, and a list, purporting to be official, gives by name the regiments, twenty in number, to which they belonged. General Pillow, however, reckoned the whole force at only 12,000, of whom many were killed during the action, and one brigade escaped. The discrepancy is large. The escape of General Floyd's brigade also requires explanation, for a single gunboat of the flotilla might have prevented it, and three or four thousand men could hardly have been embarked without being detected by a reasonably watchful enemy.

On the day that the fate of Fort Donnelson was settled, Bowling Green likewise was occupied by the Federals. That the division there should soon unite with Grant's, that Nashville, which lies defenceless on the Cumberland River, should be taken without resistance, and that the Southerners should choose some point in the less accessible country on the south or south-east for their next contest, was only to be expected. The question was, how far the Federals could dispense with the aid which the navigable rivers had hitherto offered them, both in convenience of transport and in power of artillery. At the time that I was writing this, a month after the news of Fort Donnelson's capture had arrived, the intelligence from that part of the country had dwindled to nothing, the advance was in abeyance; let us take the opportunity of tracing the various expeditions which have been made to vulnerable points on the Atlantic coast.

They may be distinguished as Butler's, Sherman's, and Burnside's. Butler's, the first, mustering 4,000 men, and backed by men-of-war bearing 100 guns, left Fort Monroe on the 26th of August, and appeared [illegible] coke Inlet, the evening of the 27th. This channel, [illegible] or sea, was guarded by two small forts. To make [illegible] them by land and sea, the disembarcation of the [illegible] began, but a [illegible]y sea stopped it, and the men-of-war opened their [illegible] without waiting [illegible]t to be completed. Considering that the larger [illegible] these forts enclosed [illegible]nly two-thirds of an acre, and that both were [illegible] field-works, mounting only 17 guns between them, we need not be surprised that they soon succumbed. The smaller was evacuated the [illegible] day of the attack, the second capitulated early next morning, and 700 prisoners, with 1,000 stand of arms, were included in the surrender. The casualties in them amounted to about fifty killed and wounded; on the other side there were none, owing to the troops not having been engaged, and the ships having judiciously kept as far off as possible. The fleet soon departed. The troops and a few gunboats remained to hold the place, but nothing occurred of sufficient importance to be mentioned here; the conquest was barren of results; it did not stop the Southerners, as was intended, from navigating those inland seas; it did

not serve as a base for further operations, and its occupation was attended with great sickness in the winter months.

The next expedition, Sherman's, was on a larger scale. It was composed of fourteen regiments and one field battery; its escort was twenty-seven men of war, with 400 guns, and its equipment included everything necessary for fortifying the point at which they might land. That point was a secret; in reality it was not fixed, but was left for circumstances to decide. Port Royal was eventually chosen, and the ships weighed anchor on the 29th October.

A severe storm on the way protracted the passage, scattered the fleet, and wrecked some of the transports. Arrived at Port Royal, the means of disembarking the regiments were found to be so much reduced, that the attack on the forts at the harbour's mouth was left to the ships alone. The bar which threatened to prevent the entrance of the larger men-of-war having been safely passed the engagement was opened. In four hours both of the principal batteries were silenced, and the Southerners' gunboats lying behind them, unable to render any efficient help, had dispersed to seek their own safety.

The white inhabitants of the neighbouring town of Beaufort fled; the negroes remained, but there was as little aid to be got from the latter as there was Union feeling to be found in the former. The first use to which Port Royal was applied was to send from it those stone-laden ships which were to be sunk at the entry of Charleston Harbour, to close it, not only for the present, but the future,—to fill it and choke it for evermore. You remember, I dare say, what indignation was expressed in Europe at such a deed, and you may remember that, to turn away the reproach, the New York papers pleaded that they only wished to bar the entrance which they could not closely blockade, and that another, in some respects better, channel remained open as a proof of their forbearance.

It is true that another channel did remain open, that they had forborne to close it; but the Admiralty chart suggests for that forbearance the charity which begins at home. The bar which stretches in front of Charleston is crossed by the main channel at six or seven miles from the forts at the harbour's mouth; but it is crossed by the other channel at a few hundred yards only from the northern fort, and the deep water outside widens like a fan, so that obstacles to prevent the passage of ships must be sunk at that one point, or not at all. Whilst, therefore, in one case they could work their will in safety, in the other they must approach under the point-blank range of heavy guns. Judge for yourselves how far this may have effected the safety of the second channel.

To return to Port Royal. At the end of November Tybee Island was occupied, by which the entrance to Savannah was commanded, and Fort Pulaski might be attacked: it has been attacked, is still under attack, but has not yet (10th April) fallen. In March, the activity which pervaded the whole war extended itself to this expedition, and two other places on the coast, Brunswick and Fernandina, each the terminus of a railway, were likewise seized; here we must leave it, that we may bring the narrative of General Burnside's expedition down to the same date.

This expedition, starting, like Sherman's, for an unknown destination, sailed from the Chesapeake on the 11th January, just at the time when

Grant's force was assembling for the invasion of Tennessee. On the 15th it entered Hatteras Inlet, and on the 7th February it made an attack on the island of Roanoke, a spot already known to American history as the place where the first discoverers sent out by Raleigh were hospitably entertained by the Indians, and where the earliest settlement was made in the State whose capital now bears his name. The island, which commands the channel between Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, is about twelve miles long, and was defended by 3,000 men, six batteries mounting forty-two guns, and eight steamers carrying two guns each. The Federals attacked it by land and sea. They were, as usual, superior in numbers, and the Southerners, as usual, had no defences of sufficient worth to restore the balance of strength. Their main body rested on an earthwork into which a man might walk, and which was attacked on three sides at once; their retreat was limited by the extent of the island, and the result need hardly be told. Everything was lost: the gun-boats indeed retired to Elizabeth Town up a creek on the north side of the Sound, but were followed and destroyed there.

Newbern, which is also within reach of the navy, fell, on the 14th March, after very similar operations; Beaufort and Washington have been taken uncontested. Many, therefore, are the points at which the Federals have now effected lodgements in the rival republic; I will briefly describe their present position (24th April). In Western Virginia they occupy the Kanawha Valley, and most of the country west of the Alleghany Mountains. In Northern Virginia they have begun to advance down the valley of the Shenandoah (an advance which occasioned the late action of Winchester), and have occupied the country for some distance from Washington towards Richmond, so far as it is not defended by the enemy.

On the eastern side, near Fort Monroe, the army under General M'Clellan (no longer commanding in chief the whole of the forces) has safely landed from the boats which brought it down the Chesapeake, and is about to attack a formidable Southern division at Yorktown. At Beaufort (North Carolina), Fort Macon, held by a few hundred men, will probably soon fall into the Federals' hands, and Fort Pulaski, at Savannah, surrounded and famishing, is said to have already offered a surrender.* Brunswick in Georgia, Fernandina and Jacksonville in Florida, have been occupied by the Federals. Fort Pickens has never been taken from them, and a formidable expedition of land and sea forces is engaged in the reduction of New Orleans. How it fares with them we are not allowed to know; a fortnight has passed since we heard of their being in the immediate neighbourhood, and so entirely is the press in the power of the Government that silence cannot mean success, whilst it may imply anything between victory and disaster.

Far up the Mississippi, beyond the borders of Tennessee, the Federals have skilfully captured the island above New Madrid, called No. 10; and in the south of the same State, close to the point where the River Tennessee enters Alabama, the greatest battle ever fought in America has just taken place. It was only on Wednesday last that the details were pub-

* News of its capture arrived a few days afterwards.

lished, and I need not enter into them. The Federal troops engaged were a part of General Grant's force, moved thither from Dover and Nashville, supported by those who had come through the middle of Kentucky from the Ohio. The Southerners had been collected from Pensacola and various other points; their arrangements seem to have deserved success, and I regret to see that among their killed was the general reported to be their most able commander, Albert Sydney Johnston. His loss will be a blow to their confidence, which they can ill afford to suffer; and by his death America loses a good soldier who might have raised her military reputation.

From Eastern Tennessee we have had no news of importance since Nashville was taken; Kentucky I believe to be exclusively occupied by the Federals, and Missouri to be generally in their hands.

If I have taken no notice of the combat between the "Monitor" and "Merrimac" it is because the result has not influenced the military progress of the war; its interest depends on considerations which would only distract your attention from the general history; and to treat it as it ought to be treated would detain me too long. Already the narrative has extended so far, that I have but little time to touch upon the wide and inviting field of review, and the following brief remarks are all that I can venture to offer.

With immense manufacturing resources, extensive commerce, and freedom from public debt, the Federals had at the outset everything that a nation could want for the purposes of war, *except* an army. For want of it their capital had once been burnt, but during the fifty years which followed they encountered no foe more formidable than Texas and Mexico, and, far from desiring to change their military system, they held it to be the best that they could maintain. Their militia was reckoned at three millions; their regular army numbered seventeen weak regiments, whose companies, employed in guarding the interior States against Indian forays, did not form one single brigade of the troops sent into the field. It was, therefore, with untrained men, inexperienced officers, and generals snatched from civil pursuits, that the Federals talked of conquering forthwith the seceded States. If they had fulfilled one hundredth part of their task in the time they named the world would have been amazed. The professional soldier's life would, indeed, be wasted, and his occupation might well be gone, if thousands of men thus hurriedly called under arms could be marched and manœuvred at will. That they could be thus handled no disinterested person was sanguine enough to suppose, but nothing less than an unmitigated failure like Bull's Run would have convinced the American journalists that their militiamen were not (to use their own words) "better than French soldiers."

Of the interior state of the Southern army we have heard little; but the glimpses which Mr. Russell obtained and communicated are in accordance with what we might expect, and the council of war at Fort Donnelson bears similar testimony to its unmilitary condition. From the Northern side the intelligence has been ample, and abounds in incidents which illustrate the want of discipline; they embrace every variety of disorder, from the careless use of arms, and the independence of sentinels on duty, to attacks on officers and mutinies in regiments. And it is not

surprising that it should have been so; the private soldiers required a judicious rule, firm but temperate : how much judgment or temperance was there amongst the officers ? What could be the state of a regiment in which (according to a New York paper) the major was drunk in his tent, the lieutenant-colonel was drunk on parade, and the colonel being tried for drunkenness, all at one and the same time? The paper may have added to the truth; but think how far the evil must have gone for such a tale to be told. After the first three months there were many changes among the officers, and another American paper doubts whether, out of 225 who had lately left, 25 had quitted their regiments without dishonour. Such was the judgment of their own press, and I can set nothing against it. Some few officers there were who had gone through the military college at West Point, and we may hope that there were many honourable exceptions to the general rule; but the majority earned for themselves, by ignorance and bad example, a most evil reputation in the early part of the war. When we think how much this must have checked the improvement of the army, we need not wonder that the main body did so little. A general would not be blamed for delaying an attack until his numbers were equal to the emergency; and want of discipline is a more dangerous failing, a more fatal weakness, than want of men.

I can well understand that the arms of the Federals should be excellent, their matériel of artillery magnificent, and their appearance on parade imposing; but the internal state of an army is not to be learned by seeing it march past at a review; and it seems to me that so great a change as would transform the Federal forces into a disciplined body *must* require a great space of time.

There are still other things to be weighed and considered before we blame either side for not showing us more operations on a large scale. Much of the country is still so covered with wood as to be unsuitable for great manœuvres, and the want of well-made roads would utterly prevent long marches, except in dry weather, or on routes where the railways could lend their aid. That roads should be few is only natural, considering that the population is still thin; but it is singular that in America they have been outstripped by railways, and iron tracks are now the first good communications made between rising towns. In Missouri, for instance, there are 720 miles of railway, whilst, a few years ago, there were only five macadamised roads, which led from St. Louis a few miles towards the interior; but it is on roads and not railways that a general must rely in his first invasion of an enemy's country.

As the country and the roads influenced the movements, so would the nature of the contest give a character to the earlier plans. In every civil war there is sure to be one or more districts where the inhabitants are divided in feeling between the combatants, and to establish one party in a superiority is the object of the first expeditions and encounters. Hence the operations in Western Virginia, Missouri, and Kentucky. Next in such cases is likely to come an attempt by the stronger side on the capital of the weaker, aided, if possible, by diversions on scattered points of his frontier. From this general maxim, rather than strategical plan, the first advance towards Richmond, and the expeditions of Burnside, Sherman,

and Butler have sprung. The invasion of Tennessee from Cairo, and the simultaneous advance through Kentucky from the Ohio are more nearly allied to the art of war, but still to be traced to the sympathies of the inhabitants.

Wherever the opponents meet on neutral ground, the weaker in arms and numbers cannot fail to be worsted, unless led by a superior skill which we can hardly expect to see. In the after part may come a period when strength may begin to rise out of the results of weakness; once out of reach of the formidable artillery, which is unendurable if it cannot be stormed or silenced, activity and daring may outweigh numbers — vindictive despair may compensate for inferiority of personal weapons— or the passive resistance of a united people make victory fruitless and subjugation impossible.

The Southern States are now approaching a crisis, which has only been hitherto deferred by the inability of the North to wield its weapons of offence. If the Confederacy of the South is not prepared to stand, it should not have been hasty to rise; if it cannot be patient to endure, it should not have been bold to strike. I see no reason to doubt that its spirit is true, but future events will speak for themselves : having explained to the best of my ability those which are past, my task is over; I have only to thank you for your attention, and to conclude by wishing you a better guide to the further scenes of the American War.

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